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Abstract
This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection
framework when agents’ production technologies display learning effects and
agents’ rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model
with full commitment available to the principal, we show that whether learn-
ing effects are over- or under-exploited crucially depends on whether learning
effects increase or decrease the principal’s uncertainty about agents’ costs of
production. Hence, what drives the over- or under-exploitation of learning ef-
fects is whether more efficient agents also learn faster (so costs diverge through
learning effects) or whether it is the less efficient agents who learn faster (so
costs converge). Furthermore, we show that if divergence in costs through
learning effects is strong enough, learning effects will not be exploited at all,
in a sense to be made precise.
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1 Introduction
Supply relations in which a firm procures a good from another firm are typically
ridden with problems of asymmetric information. The prototypical case considered
in the literature is that of a supplier enjoying private information concerning his
marginal cost of producing the good (see for instance Laffont and Martimort, 2002,
for a textbook treatment). What is characteristic of these models is the assumption
that the supplier’s marginal costs are exogenously given. However, the production of
many of the goods typically traded in such supplier relations involves learning effects,
meaning that the supplying firm can lower its marginal costs as it gains experience
with rising production volumes.1 Such relations will therefore involve endogenous
cost structures as the supplier’s marginal costs (and thereby the extent to which he
is privately informed) come to depend not only on exogenous factors, but also on
the endogenous volume of trade. This paper explores the impact of endogenizing
marginal costs on optimal procurement: Does private information concerning sup-
pliers’ extent of learning effects lead to contracts that exploit learning effects only
to an inefficiently low extent? More generally, how does the endogenous formation
of agents’ private information affect contractual arrangements?
Such questions arise not only in traditional vertical procurement relations. More
recently, Baron and Myerson’s (1982) classical question of how to regulate a mo-
nopolistic service supplier with private information on costs has been revisited (see
Lewis and Yildirim, 2002a). While we already have a fairly good understanding
of optimal regulation in stationary settings, relatively little is still known about
the impact of regulation in dynamic settings where suppliers’ technology is endoge-
nous. Specifically, technological improvements through learning effects should play
a significant role in electricity or telecommunication markets, for instance, and it is
important to understand the long-run interplay between regulation and innovation.
Again, we may wonder whether regulation in such a setting will lead to learning
effects being under-exploited and hence result in inefficiently low innovation.
To tackle these questions, we set up a simple model of procurement over two
periods, where in each period, the supplier produces and sells some amount of a good
to the procuring firm in exchange for a monetary transfer. First period marginal
costs are exogenously given (and publicly known). However, to capture learning
effects, second period marginal costs are assumed to depend on the amount of first
1Learning effects have been documented in numerous industries, such as in the production
of airplanes (Wright, 1936; Alchian, 1963), ships (Rapping, 1965; Thompson, 2001; Thornton
and Thompson, 2001), chemicals (Stobaugh and Townsend, 1975; Lieberman, 1984), machine
tools (Hirsch, 1952, 1956), computers and semiconductors (Nye, 1996; Gruber, 1998), electrical
equipment (Preston and Keachie, 1964; Sultan, 1975), nuclear power (Joskow and Rozanski, 1979;
Roberts and Burwell, 1981; Lester and McCabe, 1993) and in the weapons industry (Fox, 1988;
Gansler, 1989). While these studies all pertain to cost reducing learning effects, a recent strand of
literature also seeks do document qualitative learning effects in production.(see Moul, 2001)
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period production. Furthermore, the strength of this learning effect is assumed to be
suppliers’ private knowledge. We assume that, before the first period, the principal
can offer a menu of quantities and transfers over both periods, and that he can
commit not to renege on this contract.
In this setting, we derive the following set of results: First, whether learning
effects are over- or under-exploited in equilibrium crucially depends on whether
agents’ learning technologies are such that second-period marginal costs converge or
diverge with increasing first-period output: If second-period marginal costs diverge,
first-period production will be inefficiently low, whereas if second-period marginal
costs converge, first-period production will be inefficiently high, where the size of the
distortion in either case will depend on the rate of divergence or convergence. In this
context, the efficiency benchmark for learning by doing is the socially efficient level
of first period output given the equilibrium level of second period output. Second,
we argue that when comparing outcomes under private information to the uncon-
strained full information benchmark (i.e., without holding second period output
fixed), the above categorization according to convergence or divergence of agents’
second period costs no longer suffices to derive robust qualitative results. Only in
the first case of second-period marginal costs diverging can we generally show both
periods’ outputs to fall short of their efficient levels, whereas the overall impact
under converging costs remains open. Thirdly, we show that if second-period mar-
ginal costs diverge sufficiently with increasing output, learning effects may even be
non-exploited in the sense of first-period output falling short of its static optimum.
The paper closest in spirit to ours is Lewis and Yildirim (2002a). In the context
of optimal regulation of a service provider, the authors analyze how dynamic regula-
tion deals with suppliers’ learning effects under private information (in a companion
paper, Lewis and Yildirim, 2002b, also apply these results to vertical procurement
relations). One of its key conclusions is that by means of a more light-handed
regulatory approach, optimal policy indeed encourages learning effects, but at an
inefficiently low level. However, their model differs from ours in some important
respects. First, private information in their model pertains to the cost side of learn-
ing effects: while agent and principal have symmetric knowledge concerning the
impact of higher output today on marginal costs tomorrow (i.e. on learning effects
themselves), each period involves a transitory ‘cost-shock’ which offsets production
costs in that period only and which is known only to the agent. Hence, if we think
of learning effects as inducing a cost-benefit trade-off–where costs are inefficiently
high output today from a static viewpoint and benefits are lower marginal costs
tomorrow–then private information in their model concerns the cost side of this
trade-off. In contrast, this paper focusses on the benefit side by letting agents enjoy
private information on their learning technology.2
2There are some further differences between the models: First, whereas in Lewis and Yildirim
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a basic two-
period model of learning by doing and describes the full information benchmark.
Returning to the private information case, Section 3 works out the optimal contract
under the presumption that the principal can fully commit and discusses both its
efficiency properties and whether learning effects are even made use of in the first
place. Section 4 concludes with a brief discussion of the results and their applications
and discusses possible extensions.
2 A Simple Two-Period Model of Learning By
Doing
2.1 Setting up the Model
Consider a simple model in which a principal procures a good from an agent over
two periods. In each period, the principal’s utility is given by
vt = S(qt)− zt, t ∈ {1, 2},
where qt is the amount of the good delivered to the principal in period t, and zt is
the transfer made from the principal to the agent in that period. We assume that
S0 > 0, S00 < 0, and S0(0) = +∞, an Inada-type condition ensuring that shutdown
is never optimal. The principal’s discount factor is δ, so that his overall utility from
transactions over the two periods is given by V = v1 + δv2.3
In each period, the agent produces the good at constant marginal cost ct, so that
his utility in period t is given by
ut = zt − ctqt, t ∈ {1, 2}.
The agent has the same discount factor as the principal, so that the agent’s overall
utility is given by U = u1+δu2. Furthermore, to keep matters simple, both principal
and agent are assumed to be risk neutral.
The agent’s marginal cost in period 1, c1, is observable and known ex ante to
both agent and principal. The agent’s private knowledge concerns the structure of
(2002a), agents’ private information is independent across periods due to the transitory nature of
cost shocks, our model assumes agents’ private information to persist in the form of agents’ inherent
learning abilities. Second, Lewis and Yildirim (2002a) only let the principal offer spot-contracts
every period, whereas we permit the principal to offer a long-term contract and let him commit
not to renege on this contract.
3Note that we have assumed the principal’s marginal utility of to be the same across periods
(up to a discount factor), which reflects our learning by doing setting. However, by a simple
extension, pure investment situations could be modelled by setting the principal’s marginal utility
of first period output to zero. Our model would then describe a situation in which the investment
made by the supplier is observable, but the effects of the investment on future marginal costs are
unknown to the principal.
4
costs in period 2, c2. Marginal costs in period 2 are assumed to depend both on
private knowledge held by the agent (his type θ ∈ Θ), and the amount of the good
produced in period 1 (q1):
c2 = c2(θ, q1),
where c2 > 0, ∂c2/∂q1 < 0, and ∂2c2/∂q21 ≥ 0. The assumption that ∂c2/∂q1 < 0
captures the learning by doing effect in production: The more of the good the agent
produces in period 1, the lower the marginal costs of further production in period 2
for any given type θ.4 The condition on the second order derivative with respect to
q1 ensures that learning effects don’t grow arbitrarily large. Note however that this
simplifying assumption will need to be further strengthened to derive many of our
results below.
Further, we normalize private information (i.e. types) by assuming that ∂c2/∂θ <
0, so that a high value of θ is an indication of low marginal costs in period 2 (holding
constant the level of output in period 1, q1). Specifically, this implies that for any
first period output level q1, a higher θ-type always is more efficient in the second
period.
Figure 1 gives examples of period-two marginal cost functions which are compat-
ible with our assumptions by plotting sample cost functions for two particular types
θ > θ. Note that at this point we have made no assumptions concerning the cross
derivative ∂
2
∂q1∂θc2, which describes the difference in learning rates among agents.
While no assumptions are imposed on the sign itself, we shall assume however, that
the sign is constant, i.e. that ∂
2
∂q1∂θc2 is either positive or negative over the entire
relevant range. Furthermore, as this distinction will turn out to be important, we
introduce the following straightforward terminology:
Definition 1 (Learning Rates). For two types θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ, we shall say that the
θ1-type learns faster than the θ2-type if¯¯¯
∂
∂q1 c2(q1, θ1)
¯¯¯
>
¯¯¯
∂
∂q1 c2(q1, θ2)
¯¯¯
for all q1 ≥ 0.
In terms of the cross-partial ∂
2
∂q1∂θc2, we may thus say that (i) more efficient agents
(with a higher θ) learn faster whenever ∂2∂q1∂θc2 < 0, whereas (ii) less efficient agents
(those with a lower θ) learn faster whenever ∂2∂q1∂θc2 > 0. Finally, if
∂2
∂q1∂θc2 = 0,
agents learn at the same rate. Figure 1 shows examples for the different cases.
Summing up, we thus have two qualitative dimensions along which to differen-
tiate agents: First, the assumption that ∂c2/∂θ < 0 lets us say that high-θ agents
are ‘good’ (and low-θ agents ‘bad’) in the sense of being more efficient in the second
4Note we assume marginal costs to be constant within each period but change discontinuously
from one period to the next. Indeed, what distinguishes learning effects from simple scale economies
is that learning by doing depends on both previous production volumes and on time.
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(a) ∂2c2/∂q1∂θ = 0;
agents learn at the
same rate.
(b) ∂2c2/∂q1∂θ < 0;
high-θ agents learn
faster.
(c) ∂2c2/∂q1∂θ > 0;
low-θ agents learn
faster.
q1 q1 q1
c2 c2 c2
c2(q1, θ)
c2(q1, θ)
c2(q1, θ)
c2(q1, θ)
c2(q1, θ)
c2(q1, θ)
Figure 1: Types of Learning Effects, illustrated for two Types θ > θ.
period given any first period output–a terminology which we shall entertain for the
remainder. However, this assumption does not preclude the ‘bad’ agent from learn-
ing faster than the ‘good’ agent in the sense just discussed. These constellations are
again illustrated in Figure 1.
Finally, for expositional simplicity, we shall assume for simplicity that there are
only two possible types of agents, so θ ∈ {θ, θ} ≡ Θ. The agent knows his own
type, whereas the principal only knows the ex ante distribution of types, as given
by Prob(θ = θ) = ν.
2.2 The Full Information Benchmark
As a point of comparison, let us briefly consider the full information benchmark.
Assume for a moment that the agent’s type θ is publicly known. Given any type
θ ∈ Θ, the joint surplus of the relationship is given by
S(q1)− c1q1 + δ[S(q2)− c2(q1, θ)q2].
The principal will then offer a contract specifying (type-dependent) production levels
q1 and q2 so as to maximize joint surplus, so that first best levels of production q∗1
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and q∗2 for a θ-type satisfy the following first order conditions:5
S0(q∗1) = c1 + δq∗2
∂c2(q∗1, θ)
∂q1
(1)
S0(q∗2) = c2(q∗1, θ). (2)
By equation (2), production in period 2 is chosen simply to equate marginal utility
to the principal with marginal costs to the agent. The second term in equation (1)
shows that the choice of production level in period 1 must not only take into account
the direct benefits of the good to the principal as captured by S(q1), but also cost
savings which higher production in period 1 implies for production in period 2 due
to learning effects. Hence (recall that ∂c2/∂q1 < 0 by assumption), production in
period 1 will be higher than what would result if the choice of production levels
would ignore learning effects.
As this will prove helpful for our derivations later on, let us define the following
two functions, which describe each period’s optimal output level given output in the
other period: With slight abuse of notation, let q∗1(q2|θ) denote the function that
assigns each given second-period output level q2 the optimal first-period output level
according to (1), and similarly let q∗2(q1|θ) denote the function that assigns a given
first-period output level q1 the optimal second-period output level according to (2),
each dependent on the given type θ. The following properties of these functions
are then straightforward to derive using fist-order conditions (1) and (2) and the
assumed concavity of the social objective function:
Lemma 1. The conditional first-best levels of output have the following properties
(conditional on a given θ):
1. q∗1(q2|θ) is strictly increasing in q2, and
2. q∗2(q1|θ) is strictly increasing in q1.
Intuitively, a higher level of second-period output raises the incentive to lower
marginal second-period costs by choosing a higher level of first-period output. On
the other hand, a higher level of first-period output simply has the effect of lowering
second-period marginal costs, which induces higher second-period output. At a
more abstract level, these results are driven by the fact that first- and second-period
5While the surplus S(q1)+δS(q2) is clearly concave in q1 and q2, costs are generally nonconvex.
Thus, to ensure the validity of the first-order approach (and to make sure the maximization problem
is well defined in the first place), we shall assume that learning rates | ∂∂q1 c2| are not too large.
Specifically, the above objective function is concave if³
S00(q1)− δq2 ∂
2
∂q21
c2(q1, θ)
´
S00(q2) ≥ δ
³
∂
∂q1 c2(q1, θ)
´2
,
which will be satisfied (given S(·) and δ) whenever learning effects are not too large.
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output are complements in the social objective function, so that raising one increases
the marginal social value to rasing the other.
Finally, observe that the discounted sum of first best transfers z∗1 and z∗2 will be
pinned down by the agent’s participation constraint so as to leave the agent at his
reservation utility. If we assume that the agent’s participation constraint takes the
form U(θ) ≥ 0, ∀θ, then any pair of transfers {z∗1 , z∗2} such that
z∗1 + δz∗2 = c1q∗1 + δc2(q∗1, θ)q∗2
will be optimal from the principal’s point of view. The ambiguity in the optimal
monetary transfer scheme is a consequence of the assumption of identical discount
factors and risk attitude.
3 The Optimal Contract under Full Commitment
Let us now reintroduce the assumption that agents’ learning by doing parameter θ
is private knowledge. The first best contracts described above are then generally no
longer feasible, as at least one type of agent will want to claim to be of the other
type in order to reap a higher rent (technically, at least one type of agent’s incentive
constraint will typically be violated, as seen below). Hence, the principal will need
to offer a different contract, taking into account agents’ possibility of lying about
their type, which leads to extra restrictions on feasible contracts.
In a dynamic setting, it is important to be clear about the level of commitment
available to the principal. For now, we shall assume that at the start of the first pe-
riod, the principal can offer a long-term contract spanning both periods of gameplay,
and that he can commit not to renege on this contract.
3.1 Characterizing the Optimal Contract
The full commitment setting has the nice property that by the revelation principle
(see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, for instance), we may equivalently restrict our
attention to truth revealing mechanisms of the type {z1(θ), z2(θ), q1(θ), q2(θ)}θ∈Θ,
which specify transfers and the traded amounts of the good as a function of the
type and where each agent truthfully reveals his type.6 In our two-type model, such
a mechanism will consist of a menu of two contracts. To allow for more compact
notation, we will often drop the argument θ in favor of an upper or a lower bar in
6For practical purposes, it is important to bear in mind that the revelation principle merely
yields an equivalent representation of the optimal mechanism, whereas the actual implementation
used may look quite different (for instance, non-linear price schedules may be used instead of type
dependent menus).
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what follows, so that
(z1, z2, q1, q2) ≡ [z1(θ), z2(θ), q1(θ), q2(θ)],
(z1, z2, q1, q2) ≡ [z1(θ), z2(θ), q1(θ), q2(θ)].
In order to describe incentive compatible contracts more elegantly (see Laffont and
Martimort, 2002), define the θ-type agent’s overall utility U(θ) resulting from ‘his’
contract {z1(θ), z2(θ), q1(θ), q2(θ)} as
U(θ) = z1(θ)− c1q1(θ) + δ[z2(θ)− c2(q1(θ), θ)q2]
for all θ ∈ Θ. Then, rather than describing contracts as a menu of type dependent
payments and production schedules, we may describe them as a menu of rent and
production schedules, {U(θ), q1(θ), q2(θ)}θ∈Θ in a payoff equivalent way.7 (Again,
for notational simplicity in the two-type case, we will frequently use U ≡ U(θ) and
U ≡ U(θ) below.)
Next, let us introduce the following useful function which describes the utility
differential between types for a given contract:
Φ(q1, q2) ≡ δq2[c2(q1, θ)− c2(q1, θ)], (3)
Specifically, for a given contract (specifying output schedule (q1, q2) and transfer
schedule (z1, z2)), Φ(q1, q2) gives the difference in utility between an efficient θ-type
and an inefficient θ-type due to cost differences between types under this contract.8
Note some straightforward technical properties of the Φ(q1, q2)-function over the
relevant range, which will be useful later on (see Appendix A.1 for the derivations):
Lemma 2. The utility differential Φ(q1, q2) has the following properties:
1. Φ(q1, q2) ≥ 0, with the inequality being strict whenever q2 > 0,
2. ∂Φ/∂q2 > 0,
3. sgn[∂Φ/∂q1] = −sgn[∂2c2/(∂q1∂θ)] · sgn[q2].
4. sgn[∂2Φ/∂q1∂q2] = −sgn[∂2c2/(∂q1∂θ)] · sgn[q2]
5. Φ(q1, q2) is convex in (q1, q2) if and only if ∂2c2/(∂q1∂θ) = 0.
7‘Payoff equivalent’ means that such contracts of course only specify aggregate discounted trans-
fers z1(θ) + δz2(θ), but not the exact split of transfers across periods. To achieve the latter, we
would need to consider contracts of the type {u1(θ), u2(θ), q1(θ), q2(θ)}θ∈Θ, where ut is the agent’s
utility levels in period t. This presents no restriction in the current setting however, as both the
principal’s and the agent’s payoffs are affected only by aggregate discounted transfers.
8Since transfers (z1, z2) enter utility in the same additive fashion for both types, they do not
affect the utility differential, which is why Φ(·) depends only on the arguments q1 and q2.
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The first assertion is almost tautological by noting that the more efficient agent’s
rent will exceed the less efficient agent’s rent for any given contract specifying a given
pair of transfers and quantities q1 and q2. The second assertion states that the utility
differential is strictly increasing in period-two output, as the lower second-period
marginal costs of the efficient θ-type are magnified by a larger output. Assertion 3
notes that the utility differential is increasing in q1 if the more efficient agent also
learns faster, and decreasing in q1 if the inefficient agent learns faster. For a strictly
positive, fixed level of second-period output, the utility differential is of course driven
by types’ difference in marginal costs. While both are decreasing in q1 by assumption
in absolute terms, the utility differential is driven by types’ relative learning rates.
As Figure 1 illustrates, second-period costs diverge (i.e. the difference increases) if
the more efficient type also learns faster, whereas they converge if the inefficient
type learns faster. This drives the sign on ∂∂q1Φ. This impact of first-period output
on the utility differential is of course magnified by a larger volume of second-period
output for the marginal cost-differences to materialize over, which is why ∂∂q1Φ and
∂2
∂q1∂q2Φ have the same sign, as noted in assertion 4. Finally, assertion 5 notes that
in all cases but the degenerate one in which types learn at the same rate, the utility
differential is not convex in its arguments, which will be important further down.
For now, we shall further assume that reservation utilities are not type dependent
and normalized to zero, so that the participation constraints take the form
U(θ) ≥ 0 (PC)
U(θ) ≥ 0. (PC)
This may be interpreted as both types facing identical outside options, i.e. the good
type not having better prospects outside of the relationship with the principal than
the bad type.
Given these preliminaries, we may state the following proposition, which permits
us to greatly simplify the description of the principal’s mechanism design problem:
Proposition 1. (a) The uninformed principal’s problem of designing the optimal in-
centive compatible contract can equivalently be expressed as choosing type-dependent
allocations, (q1, q2) and (q1, q2), so as to maximize his expected payoff,
Π(q1, q2, q1, q2) ≡ ν
©
S(q1)− c1q1 + δ[S(q2)− c2(q1, θ)q2]
ª
+ (1− ν)
©
S(q1)− c1q1 + δ[S(q2)− c2(q1, θ)q2]
ª
(4)
− νΦ(q1, q2),
subject to the implementability condition
Φ(q1, q2) ≥ Φ(q1, q2), (5)
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and settings types’ rents (and thereby implicitly transfers) at U = Φ(q1, q2) and
U = 0.
(b) Furthermore, whenever the principal’s objective function in (4) is concave in
its arguments, the implementability condition (5) will not be binding at the optimum.
The proofs are given in the Appendix. Proving part (a) involves explicitly
spelling out the types’ incentive constraints using the notation developed above,
and then employing standard techniques to derive the implementability condition
and to show that only the efficient types’ incentive constraint and the inefficient
types’ participation constraint will be binding at the optimum. Proving part (b) is
somewhat less standard and more involved.
The reduced form of the principal’s payoff as given in (4) can be explained by
noting that the first two lines of (4), to which we shall assign the function W (·) as
W (q1, q2, q1, q2) ≡ ν
©
S(q1)− c1q1 + δ[S(q2)− c2(q1, θ)q2]
ª
+ (1− ν)
©
S(q1)− c1q1 + δ[S(q2)− c2(q1, θ)q2]
ª
, (6)
correspond to the expected social surplus of the allocation (q1, q2, q1, q2). Indeed,
the socially optimal allocation as described in the previous section is obtained by
maximizing W (·) with respect to its arguments. Clearly, this would also be the
principal’s ex ante expected payoff if he were able to verify the agent’s type and
thus appropriate the full surplus from dealing with either possible type of agent.
As this is not the case under incomplete information, however, the principal must
take into account the two types’ incentive constraints in order to keep agents from
misreporting their types. As one might expect, the relevant incentive problem turns
out to be the more efficient agent claiming to be of the inefficient type in order
to obtain a higher compensation for his allegedly higher costs. Thus, the efficient
θ-type agent must be given an informational rent equal to the utility he could gain
by claiming to be a θ-type, which by the definition of the Φ-function as the utility
differential between types is given by Φ(q1, q2). As this informational rent needs
to be paid with probability ν (the probability of dealing with an efficient type),
incomplete information causes the principal’s expected payoff to be diminished by
νΦ(q1, q2), so that his expected utility is given by
Π(q1, q2, q1, q2) =W (q1, q2, q1, q2)− νΦ(q1, q2),
as shown in (4).
Finally, let us shed some light on the meaning of the implementability condition
(5). Recalling the interpretation of Φ as a utility differential between types for a
given contract, condition (5) says that the gains from being a good rather than a
bad type must be larger under the contract designed for the good type (involving
production volumes q1 and q2) than under the contract designed for the bad type
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(involving production volumes q1 and q2). Equivalently, the (q1, q2)-allocation must
involve larger cost savings of the good over the bad type than the (q1, q2)-allocation.
Recall from our previous discussion that any incentive compatible contract must
involve the efficient θ-type getting a rent of at least Φ(q1, q2) over the inefficient θ-
type’s to keep him from pretending to be inefficient. At the same time, the inefficient
θ-agent could always misrepresent his type which would then increase his rent by at
least Φ(q1, q2) less the amount by which the good type’s costs exceed the bad type’s
for that contract, namely Φ(q1, q2). Whenever the implementability condition is
violated, this deviation is obviously profitable. Thus, allocations which violate the
implementability condition cannot be implemented because there is no choice of
transfers that could make both agents truthfully reveal their type.9
Part (b) of Proposition 1 shows however that, as one might expect intuitively,
this restriction on incentive feasible allocations can be neglected whenever the prin-
cipal’s objective is concave in its arguments. In other words, this condition need not
concern the principal in finding the optimal contract since a contract violating the
implementability condition can never be (unconstrained) optimal in the first place.
The reason why we have only shown this for concave objective functions is somewhat
subtle and has to do with the fact that as soon as the principal’s objective is not
concave, the optimal mechanism will often be stochastic. In the present context,
a stochastic mechanism would be one which, for every revealed type, the agent is
asked to implement one out of a range of output combinations at random accord-
ing to a prespecified probability distribution. However, such stochastic mechanisms
bring with them a number of conceptual problems (see for instance Laffont and Mar-
timort, 2002, pp. 65—67, on stochastic mechanisms in the standard model), which
is why for the remainder of our analysis, we shall restrict ourselves to situations in
which the principal’s objective (4) is concave.10
9Note that in contrast to the standard static model, this implementability condition involves
a joint restriction on both periods’ production levels. The shape this constraint takes crucially
depends on the cross derivative ∂2c2/(∂q1∂θ). If ∂2c2/(∂q1∂θ) = 0, then ∂Φ/∂q1 = 0 by Lemma
2, so that we retrieve the implementability condition of the static model for second period outputs
only, namely q2 ≥ q2. Intuitively then, first period production volumes have no impact on cost
savings of the good over the bad type, and hence are irrelevant for the separation of types.
10Observe that concavity of the first best objective function W (·), as implicitly required in our
above first-best analysis, is not sufficient here to guarantee concavity of the full objective function
since we have seen above in Lemma (2) that Φ(q1, q2) is generally non-convex. However, we may
again spell out this concavity requirement explicitly. Letting g(q1, q2) ≡ (1 − ν)
©
S(q1) − c1q1 +
δ[S(q2)−c2(q1, θ)q2]
ª
−νΦ(q1, q2) denote the objective function and using the second order partials
of Φ given in Section A.1 in the Appendix, we have
∂2
∂q12 g = (1− ν)
h
S00(q1)− δq2 ∂
2
∂q12 c2(q1, θ)
i
− νδq2
h
∂2
∂q12 c2(q1, θ)−
∂2
∂q12 c2(q1, θ)
i
∂2
∂q22 g = δ(1− ν)S
00(q2)
∂2
∂q1∂q2 g = −δ(1− ν)
∂
q1 c2(q1, θ)− νδ
h
∂
∂q1 c2(q1, θ)−
∂
∂q1 c2(q1, θ)
i
,
12
3.2 Efficiency Properties of the Optimal Contract
Having greatly simplified the characterization of the principal’s optimal contract un-
der incomplete information by means of Proposition 1, we now proceed to investigate
its efficiency properties. Specifically, we shall try to derive qualitative differences
between quantities specified in the contract offered by the uninformed principal and
the optimal quantities under full information as derived in Section 2.
Recall to this end that the efficient levels of output, denoted {q1∗, q2∗, q1∗, q1∗},
maximize expected social welfare W (·):
(q1∗, q2∗, q1∗, q1∗) = arg maxq1,q2,q1,q1W (q1, q2, q1, q1). (7)
By Proposition 1, the quantities specified in the uninformed principal’s contract,
denoted {q1SB, q2SB, q1SB, q1SB}, are those that maximize Π(·):
(q1SB, q2SB, q1SB, q1SB) = arg maxq1,q2,q1,q1Π(q1, q2, q1, q1)
= arg max
q1,q2,q1,q1
W (q1, q2, q1, q1)− ν · Φ(q1, q2). (8)
Observe two important properties of the two objective functions W (·) and Π(·).
First, both objective functions are additively separable in (q1, q2) and (q1, q2). Hence,
in both cases, the marginal returns to q1 and q2 are independent of q1 and q2 and vice
versa. Consequently, the optimal values of q1 and q2 in both cases are independent
of whether we condition on the remaining variables q1 and q2 or not, and vice versa
for the optimal values of q1 and q2. Further, the two objective functions differ only
in the additive term ν ·Φ(q1, q2), which is also independent of q1 and q2. From this,
the following result should be obvious:
Proposition 2. Under the uninformed principal, the efficient agent still produces
efficient quantities in both periods, so q1SB = q1∗ and q2SB = q2∗.
Proof. By differentiation of the objective functions, it is easily checked that the
principal’s and social returns to q1 and q2 are equal and, due to additive separability
of both functions in (q1, q2) and (q1, q2), independent of the associated values of q1
and q2 in each case:
∂
∂q1W (·) = ∂∂q1Π(·) = ν
h
S0(q1)− c1 − δq2 ∂∂q1 c2(q1, θ)
i
∂
∂q2W (·) = ∂∂q2Π(·) = νδ
£
S0(q1 − c2(q1, θ)
¤
.
so that concavity of the objective function is equivalent to
(1− ν)
n
(1− ν)S00(q1)− δq2
h
∂2
∂q12 c2(q1, θ)− ν
∂2
∂q12 c2(q1, θ)
io
S00(q2)
≥ δ
n
∂
q1 c2(q1, θ)− ν
∂
∂q1 c2(q1, θ)
o2
.
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Hence, any values of (q1, q2) which maximizeW (·) also maximizeΠ(·), independently
of the associated values of (q1, q2). The result then immediately follows by the fact
that we have assumed the maximizer to be interior and unique by the assumed
concavity of the objective.
This result is akin to the ‘no distortion at the top’ result, familiar from the static
model, which states that incomplete information does not alter production levels of
the efficient θ-agent. Intuitively, this result is due to the fact that in designing the
optimal contract, the principal need worry only about ‘downward lying’, i.e. the
efficient agent claiming to be inefficient. This agency cost, ν · Φ(q1, q2), is only a
function of the inefficient type’s levels of output, q1 and q2, but unaffected by the
efficient type’s output schedule, so that there is no incentive to distort the good
type’s output schedule.
A more direct but perhaps less instructive way to see this result is to explicitly
consider the first-order conditions on q1SB and q2SB,
S0(q1SB) = c1 + δq2SB
∂c2(q1SB, θ)
∂q1
, (9)
S0(q2SB) = c2(q1SB, θ), (10)
and noting that they are identical to the first-order conditions on first-best output
q1∗ and q2∗ derived in Section 2, conditions (1) and (2).
However, the above optimization programs indicate that the inefficient type’s
output schedule, q1 and q2, will be subject to distortions due to the expected in-
formation rent ν ·Φ(q1, q2), which drives a wedge between social objectives and the
uninformed principal’s objectives. In a first step, we shall be interested in distor-
tions in q1 and q2, respectively, given the values of all other variables. To this end,
again with slight abuse of notation, define q2SB(q1) to be the level of second-period
output q2 which maximizes the principal’s objective function Π(·) given any first-
period output q1 and the efficient type’s output schedule (q1, q2) (recall that due to
the additive separability, q1SB(·) will be independent of the latter two). Recall that
in section 2, we have similarly defined conditional first-best output in period two,
q∗2(q1|θ) ≡ q2∗(q1), which we can now interpret as the value of q2 which maximizes
expected social welfare W (·) given q1, q1, and q2. Then, the following result should
be rather obvious:
Proposition 3. For given first period output, private information about learning
effects leads the uninformed principal to distort the bad type’s second period output
downward from its socially efficient level: q2SB(q1) < q2∗(q1) for all q1 ≥ 0.
Proof. This can be seen immediately by comparing the marginal social returns to
q2 with the principal’s returns to q2 given any level of q1:
∂
∂q2Π(·) = ∂∂q2W (·)− ν · ∂∂q2φ(·).
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Since ∂∂q2φ > 0 by the properties of Φ(·) derived in Lemma 2, so that the informa-
tional rent is strictly increasing in q2, we known that ∂∂q2Π <
∂
∂q2W , so that for any
given first-period output q1, the principal’s returns to marginally raising q2 fall short
of the corresponding social returns. Given that the optima are unique and interior
by assumption, the result then follows immediately from simple univariate robust
comparative statics.
The reason that this result should come as no surprise is that for given first-
period output levels, each type’s second-period marginal costs c2 are given. Hence,
the principal’s optimization problem is similar to the standard model of choosing
single-period output with fixed type-dependent marginal costs, for which it is a
familiar result that the less efficient type’s output is distorted downward (the ‘dis-
tortion at the bottom’ result): The principal must trade off efficiency, as captured by
joint surplus W (·), against expected rent payments to the efficient type, νΦ(q1, q2).
Clearly then, starting from the conditionally efficient level of second-period output
which maximizesW (·), q2∗, marginally lowering q2 has no first-order efficiency effect,
but decreases the informational rent by Lemma 2.
While the above approach of showing how the principal’s and the social objective
systematically differ with respect to the marginal effect of q2 aides intuition, note
that given that uniqueness of the optimum and concavity of the objective are satis-
fied, we may again alternatively consider the first-order condition on second-period
output in the principal’s maximization problem,
S0(q2) = c2(q1, θ) +
ν
1− ν
∂
∂q2Φ(q1, q2)
= c2(q1, θ) +
ν
1− ν
£
c2(q1, θ)− c2(q1, θ)
¤
, (11)
and observe that the distortionary third term on the right-hand side will be positive.
Hence, for given first-period output, our model captures familiar effects. Let us
now turn to distortionary incentives concerning first-period output, for now keeping
second-period output fixed:
Proposition 4. For given second period output, private information about the agent’s
learning effects leads the uninformed principal to distort the inefficient type’s first
period output
• downward if the efficient type learns faster than the inefficient type: q1SB(q2) <
q1∗(q2) for all q2 > 0, and
• upward if the inefficient type learns faster than the efficient type: q1SB(q2) >
q1∗(q2) for all q2 > 0.
There is no distortion in first-period output if agents learn at the same rate, so
q1SB(q2) = q1∗(q2).
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Proof. Again, consider the principal’s marginal returns to increasing q1, which we
may write as
∂
∂q1Π(·) = ∂∂q1W (·)− ν · ∂∂q1Φ(·).
Now, from Lemma 2, we know that the sign on ∂∂q1Φ depends on agents’ relative
learning rates. If the efficient type learns faster, so ∂
2
∂q1∂θc2 < 0, then
∂
∂q1Φ > 0
by Lemma (2) whenever q2 > 0, so that ∂∂q1Π <
∂
∂q1W , i.e. for any second-period
output q2 > 0, the principal’s returns to marginally raising q1 fall short of the
corresponding social returns. On the contrary, if the inefficient agent learns faster,
then ∂∂q1Π >
∂
∂q1W by analogous reasoning using Lemma 2, so that for any second-
period output q2 > 0, the principal’s returns to marginally raising q1 exceed the
corresponding social returns. Finally, if both agents learn at the same rate, then
∂
∂q1Φ = 0, so that
∂
∂q1Π =
∂
∂q1W . Again, given that the optima are unique and
interior by assumption, each of the results then follow immediately from simple
univariate robust comparative statics.
To develop an intuition for this result (still keeping second period output fixed),
recall that the difference in marginal costs between types is c2(q1, θ) − c2(q1, θ).
Loosely speaking, this difference captures the extent of agents’ private knowledge in
the second period: the larger the difference, the larger the principal’s uncertainty
about types’ costs, and hence the larger the rent that must be given up to the good
type in order to induce him not to lie about his type in period two. Now by choice
of q1, the principal may influence the difference in period-two marginal costs and
thereby the extent to which agents are privately informed. Whether this induces the
principal to distort first-period output up- or downward then depends on whether
the difference c2(q1, θ) − c2(q1, θ) is increasing or decreasing in first period output,
which in turn depends on the sign of ∂2c2/∂q1∂θ, i.e. how agents’ rates of learning
differ. This allows us to distinguish the following cases (inspection of Figure 1 may
help in keeping tabs on cases):
• Agents learn at the same rate: ∂2c2/∂q1∂θ = 0.
In this case, the difference in marginal costs between types, c2(q1, θ)−c2(q1, θ),
is independent of first period output. Hence, given any period-two output
schedules, the principal has no incentive to distort first period output away
from its efficient level, as this has no impact on agents’ extent of private
knowledge and thereby the information rent payable to the good type.
• Efficient type also learns faster: ∂2c2/∂q1∂θ < 0.
The difference in types’ second period marginal costs, c2(q1, θ)− c2(q1, θ), now
increases in first period output: As the type which already enjoys lower second
period costs learns even faster, higher first period output serves to widen cost
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differences between types and thereby the extent of private information. To
reduce the rent payable to the good type, the principal will therefore want to
distort q1 downward.
• Inefficient type learns faster: ∂2c2/∂q1∂θ > 0.
When the good type’s rate of learning is lower than the bad type’s, first period
output must be raised in order to reduce c2(q1, θ)− c2(q1, θ): As the bad type
learns faster with increasing q1, his marginal costs will approach the good
type’s. The principal will therefore want to distort q1 upward from its socially
efficient level.
Once more, let us note for completeness that the above result may have been
derived directly by considering the principal’s first-order condition on first-period
output,
S0(q1) = c1 + δq2
∂c2(q1, θ)
∂q1
+
ν
1− ν
∂Φ(q1, q2)
∂q1
= c1 + δq2
∂c2(q1, θ)
∂q1
+
ν
1− ν δq2
"
∂c2(q1, θ)
∂q1
−
∂c2(q1, θ)
∂q1
#
, (12)
and noting that the distortionary third term depends on which type of agent learns
faster.
The results so far concerning the inefficient type’s output schedule are of course
only partial, as in each case we have held fixed the other period’s output schedule.
Ultimately, the principal will simultaneously distort both q1 and q2 relative to the
full-information efficiency benchmark in order to implement the optimal trade-off
between allocative efficiency, as represented byW (·), and expected rent payments to
the good type, ν ·Φ(q1, q2). Put differently, the above analysis reveals the direction in
which each periods’ output under asymmetric information could be manipulated in
order to increase social welfare while keeping the other periods’ output fixed. This
leaves open the direction of efficiency enhancing output changes when both peri-
ods’ output can be manipulated simultaneously. Clearly then, the complementarity
relation between q1 and q2 in the objective functions will be crucial.
To make this specific, consider the case in which the inefficient agent learns faster.
We then know already that ∂∂q1Π >
∂
∂q1W and
∂
∂q2Π <
∂
∂q2W , so that starting from the
efficient allocation, the principal has an upward disortionary incentive for first-period
output and a downward distortionary incentive for second-period output. Now if we
had ∂
2
∂q1∂q2W < 0 and
∂2
∂q1∂q2Π < 0, then these incentives would reinforce each other
as lower second-period output q2 would further raise the incentive to distort first-
period output q1 upward and vice versa, and simple supermodular analysis would
confirm this intuition by showing that overall, the equilibrium will involve an upward
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distortion in first-period output and a downward distortion in second-period output.
However, we have previously argued in Section 2 that outputs are complementary
in the social objective, so ∂
2
∂q1∂q2W > 0, as is easily checked. Furthermore, we
know from Lemma 2 that ∂
2
∂q1∂q2Φ > 0 when the inefficient agent learns faster, as
in this case a higher volume of first-period output reduces differences in marginal
costs, which in turn reduces agency costs per unit of second-period output and
thereby increases the incentive to raise second-period output. Hence, ∂
2
∂q1∂q2Π =
∂2
∂q1∂q2W +
∂2
∂q1∂q2Φ >
∂2
∂q1∂q2W > 0, so that the complementarity in first- and second-
period output schedules work against the partial first-order effects, which should
make it difficult to derive robust results on overall distortions when the inefficient
agent learns faster.
Next, consider the case in which the efficient agent learns faster. We then know
that ∂∂q1Π <
∂
∂q1W and
∂
∂q2Π <
∂
∂q2W , so that starting from the efficient allocation,
the principal has a downward disortionary incentive concerning both periods’ out-
puts. Now in this case, ∂
2
∂q1∂q2W > 0 and
∂2
∂q1∂q2Π > 0 would cause these incentives
to reinforce each other. We have already argued above that indeed, ∂
2
∂q1∂q2W > 0.
However, when the efficient agent learns faster, then ∂
2
∂q1∂q2Φ < 0 by Lemma 2: A
higher level of first-period output q1 then further increases the marginal cost differ-
ences between types, increasing second-period agency costs per piece, and thereby
giving an incentive to lower second-period output q2. In sum, it is easily seen that
∂2
∂q1∂q2Π will be positive for some, and negative for other settings, and only in the
former case will supermodular analysis deliver a clear result.11
Nevertheless, we can derive the following general result concerning overall equi-
librium distortions in the case of the efficient agent also learning faster:
Proposition 5. If the more efficient agent also learns faster, then private informa-
tion causes an overall downward distortion in both first- and second-period output
for the inefficient type, so q1SB < q1∗ and q2SB < q2∗.
Proof. To show this result, we consider each of the possible quadrants around
(q1∗, q2∗) in turn. First, consider the case in which q1SB ≥ q1∗ and q2SB ≥ q2∗. We
know that this cannot be optimal since the uninformed principal’s objective func-
tion is concave by assumption and both partials are strictly negative at (q1∗, q2∗)
11Indeed, it is easily checked that ∂
2
∂q1∂q2Π > 0 whenever
ν ·
¯¯¯
∂
∂q1 c2(q1, θ)
¯¯¯
<
¯¯¯
∂
∂q1 c2(q1, θ)
¯¯¯
, ∀q1 ≥ 0,
so that either the efficient agent does not learn too much faster than the inefficient agent or efficient
agents are relatively scarce, a condition which we will see again in Section 3.3’s analysis of whether
learning effects are exploited at all. If the inequality is reversed for all q1, then ∂
2
∂q1∂q2Π < 0.
18
q2
q2∗
q2SB
q1SB q1∗ q1
q2∗(q1)
q2SB(q1)
q1SB(q2) q1∗(q2)
Figure 2: Restrictions on Equilibrium Quantities when the Efficient Agent also
Learns Faster.
whenever the efficient agent also learns faster.
Next, consider the case in which q1SB ≤ q1∗ and q2SB ≥ q2∗. Recall that the
inefficient type’s conditional first-best function for second-period output, q2∗(q1), is
strictly increasing in q1. Thus, whenever q1SB ≤ q1∗, we must have q2∗(q1SB) ≤
q2∗(q1∗). But from Proposition 3, we know that q2SB(q1SB) < q2∗(q1SB), and hence
whenever q1SB ≤ q1∗, then q2SB ≡ q2SB(q1SB) < q2∗(q1∗) ≡ q2∗. Thus, q1SB ≤ q1∗ and
q2SB ≥ q2∗ can never be optimal.
Finally, consider the case in which q1SB ≥ q1∗ and q2SB ≤ q2∗. Recall that
conditional first-best output in the first period, q1∗(q2) is also increasing in second-
period output, so that q1∗(q2SB) ≤ q1∗(q2∗) whenever q2SB ≤ q2∗. But Proposition
4 tells us that whenever the more efficient agent also learns faster, q1SB(q2SB) <
q1∗(q2SB). Hence, if the efficient agent also learns faster, then q1SB ≥ q1∗ and q2SB ≤
q2∗ can never be optimal.
This result has a simple graphical representation, shown in Figure 2. Here, the
first-best output combination is represented by the intersection of the conditionally
optimal output curves, q1∗(q2) and q2∗(q1), in (q1, q2)-space. We know from our pre-
vious analysis that due to the complementarity of first-and second-period output in
the social objective function, both curves have a positive slope. Furthermore, it can
easily be seen that the social objective being concave by assumption implies that the
q1∗(q2)-curve intersects the q2∗(q1)-curve from below at (q1∗, q2∗) in (q1, q2)-space, as
shown in the figure.12 Now Proposition 3 tells us that second-period output will be
12Formally, this can be shown by explicitly writing down the slopes of the two curves using
their defining first-order conditions, (12) and (11), and using the explicit concavity requirement in
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Figure 3: Restrictions on Equilibrium Quantities when the Inefficient Agent Learns
Faster.
distorted downward given any first-period output level, so that the q2SB(q1)-curve
will lie to the left of the q2∗(q1)-curve. Furthermore, Proposition 4 tells us that when-
ever the more efficient agent also learns faster, first-period output will be distorted
downward given any second-period output level, so that the q1SB(q2)-curve will lie
to the left of the q1∗(q2)-curve. But then the equilibrium under private information,
which is determined by the intersection of the q2SB(q1)- and the q1SB(q2)-curve must
lie to the left of the q1∗(q2)-curve and below the q2∗(q1)-curve, the shaded area in
Figure 2. Due to the described properties of the two conditional first-best curves,
this are will always lie strictly in the southeast quadrant, i.e. where q1 < q1∗ and
q2 < q2∗.
Why this sort of argument no longer goes through when the less efficient agent
learns faster should become clear from Figure 3. Again, the downward distortion in
second-period output implies that the equilibrium output combination under private
information lies below the q2∗(q1)-curve. However, Proposition 4 in this case tells
us that there will be an upward distortion in first-period output given any second-
period output, so that the new equilibrium must lie to the right of the q1∗(q2)-curve.
Thus, when the less efficient agent learns faster, we can only preclude equilibria with
q1SB < q1∗ and q2SB > q2∗.
While this by itself is of course no proof that all other three equilibria may indeed
occur when the less efficient agent learns faster, it is easy to find parametric examples
which indeed host all three equilibria for different parameter values. Particularly,
we note the following result:
footnote 5.
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Proposition 6. If the less efficient agent learns faster, then private information
can cause an overall upward distortion in both first- and second-period output for
the inefficient type, so q1SB > q1∗ and q2SB > q2∗.
Proof. To see this, consider the case in which the second period cost function is
given by the linear form c2(q1, θ) = c(θ)− γ(θ)q1 with c(θ) > c(θ) > 0 and γ(θ) ≥ 0,
and where the principal’s objective function is given by the quadratic form S(qt) =
aqt − bq2t , where a, b > 0. Note that the less efficient agent learning faster simply
means that γ(θ) > γ(θ) in this linear specification. Then, for instance, setting
a = 100, b = 80, c1 = 75, c(θ) = 50, c(θ) = 30, γ(θ) = 95, γ(θ) = 60, δ = 0.7, and
ν = 0.5 (the concavity requirement on the principal’s objective function are easily
checked for this parameterization), we obtain an optimal contract involving q1 = 0.49
and q2 = 0.58, whereas the first best would entail q1∗ = 0.38 and q2∗ = 0.54.
3.3 Are Learning Effects Exploited At All?
Our analysis thus far has been focussed on comparing the output levels under private
information to their constrained and unconstrained first-best counterparts under
complete information. Additionally, however, we should be interested in knowing
whether learning effects are exploited at all in the first place (for the bad type).
For this comparison, the natural benchmark for first-period output is that which
would result if either (i) first-period output in fact had no impact on second-period
marginal costs, so ∂∂q1 c2 ≡ 0, or (ii) both principal and agent behaved myopically,
taking into account only first-period payoffs. In either hypothetical case, the optimal
choice of q1 will equalize marginal returns in period one, S0(q1), with marginal costs
c1. First period output will be higher than this whenever S0(q1) < c1, and lower
whenever S0(q1) > c1. Motivated by this, we introduce the following terminology:
Definition 2 (Exploitation of Learning Effects). We shall say that learning
effects are exploited whenever first-period marginal returns to output fall short of
the marginal costs of output, so S(q1) < c1.
Recall from (12) that the first order condition on first-period output is
S0(q1) = c1 + δq2
∂c2(q1, θ)
∂q1
+
ν
1− ν δq2
"
∂c2(q1, θ)
∂q1
−
∂c2(q1, θ)
∂q1
#
.
If the right-hand side of this condition falls short of c1, then first-period output
of the optimal contract will exceed the benchmark output, so learning effects are
indeed exploited even under private information. If the right-hand side is greater
than c1, the reverse is true. Thus, we may state the following result:
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Proposition 7. If the efficient agent does not learn too much faster than the inef-
ficient agent, so
ν ·
¯¯¯
∂
∂q1 c2(q1, θ)
¯¯¯
<
¯¯¯
∂
∂q1 c2(q1, θ)
¯¯¯
, ∀q1 ≥ 0, (13)
then learning effects are exploited in the sense that first-period marginal returns to
output fall short of marginal costs c1. If the good agent learns sufficiently faster than
the bad agent, on the other hand (so that the inequality is reversed), then learning
effects are not exploited, so first-period marginal returns to output exceed marginal
costs.
It should be pointed out that describing condition (13) as ‘the efficient agent not
learning too much faster than the inefficient agent’ implicitly assumes that the ratio
of types, as given by ν, is fixed. More generally, (13) represents a joint condition
on both the prevalence of types that will be met whenever the efficient agent does
not learn too much faster or efficient types are scarce enough. Either constellation
ensures that incentives to distort first-period output downward for rent-extraction
purposes do not outweigh the gains achievable through learning effects: The efficient
agent not learning too much faster implies that the informational rent payable to
the efficient type–whenever increasing in q1–is not too large, whereas ν being low
implies that this informational rent is less likely to have to be paid in the first place,
thus decreasing the motive for rent-extraction relative to efficiency concerns. Finally,
as a straightforward corollary, note that learning effects (for the inefficient type) will
always be exploited if the efficient agent doesn’t learn at all, so ∂∂q1 c2(q1, θ) ≡ 0.
4 Conclusion
Our model has analyzed how the introduction of privately known learning capa-
bilities into the standard dynamic model of adverse selection influences incentive
design. The main focus has been on whether private information leads to an under-
or an over-exploitation of learning effects relative to the efficient level. First, we
have seen that in the familiar ‘no distortion at the top’-fashion, the more efficient
agent (i.e., having lower second period costs given any first period output) will pro-
duce efficient levels of first- and second-period output. Concerning the less efficient
agent, we have shown that whether first-period production is inefficiently high or
low relative to second-period output crucially depends on whether the inefficient
type learns faster (so that second-period marginal costs converge with rising first-
period output), or whether the efficient type learns faster (causing second-period
marginal costs to diverge). If second-period costs diverge, our results parallel those
in Lewis and Yildirim (2002a) in that learning effects will be under-exploited. If
second-period costs converge, however, our model predicts an over-exploitation of
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learning effects. Furthermore, we have seen the size of this distortion in either case
to depend on (i) the rate of divergence or convergence, and (ii) the prevalence of
inefficient types. Second, we have seen that only when second-period costs diverge
can we show that these effects unambiguously lead to an overall downward distor-
tion in both periods’ output relative to the fully efficient benchmark, whereas the
direction of the overall distortion remains ambiguous for converging costs. Particu-
lary, we have also seen that converging costs may indeed lead to an overall upward
distortion in both periods’ output. Third, we have seen the divergence in costs be-
ing strong enough may even lead to learning effects not being exploited in the first
place, which again contrast with Lewis and Yildirim’s (2002a) result that learning
effects will always be exploited, albeit to an inefficiently low extent.
More generally, our analysis has shown that in order to predict an under- or over-
exploitation of learning effects in dynamic adverse selection settings, it is important
to identify whether these learning effects serve to magnify or to diminish differences
in efficiency between types. Concerning vertical procurement relationships, for in-
stance, we may seek to categorize supplying industries along these lines according
to their technology. For example, consider rather simple low-tech inputs produced
in more traditional ‘bread-and-butter’ industries where there is little scope for large
technological improvements. Even if there is originally some scope for improvements
through learning by doing, we would eventually expect all agents to ‘catch on to
the trick’ (some types sooner, some later), after which there is little scope for fur-
ther improvement. Thus, we would expect learning effects to quickly subside and to
equalize agents’ productivity. In such industries, our model would predict learning
effects to be over- rather than under-exploited. In contrast, consider suppliers of
more high-tech products such as the computer chip industry. Here, we would expect
significant scope for long-run improvements in production technologies. Further, we
would expect inherently more creative suppliers to ever improve their lead on less ef-
ficient suppliers through accumulated learning effects. For such suppliers, our model
predicts learning effects to be under- rather than over-exploited. Similar technolog-
ical arguments may also let us differentiate strategies concerning the regulation of
monopolistic suppliers.
However, one may also think of possible applications of our model outside the
realm of pure procurement and regulation settings. Consider employment relations,
for instance, where how hard an agent works today influences his future productivity
on the job. If we expect hard work to make a less efficient worker catch up with the
more efficient worker’s productivity, we should expect the employer to ask agents to
work inefficiently hard on the job. If, on the other hand, we expect harder work today
to magnify productivity differences between workers (as might be the case on more
creative jobs), we should expect the employer to relax workers’ workload below the
efficient level. Slightly more far-fetched fields of application may include the credit
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market problems in the style of Freixas and Laffont (1990), where the borrower is
privately informed about the returns to his project. If the future productivity of
capital in the project systematically depends on the size of the loan today, then
our analysis would predict inefficiently high first-period loans if higher loans cause
second-period productivity to converge and vice versa if productivity converges.
Finally, the insights may be applied to models of discrimination in quantity and
quality by a monopolist supplier (see Maskin and Riley, 1984; Mussa and Rosen,
1978) if we assume that consumers get used to or even addicted to a good, so
that consuming more (or a higher quality) of the good today increases consumers’
willingness to pay tomorrow. The learning speed criterion of our model would then
pertain to whether customers with a higher willingness to pay for the good also get
used to the good faster, or whether it is the customers who value the good less who
get used to it at a faster rate.
Nevertheless, some of these stories may appear to be stretching the simple two-
period framework of our model, which brings up the scope for further extensions:
First, it should be interesting to extend the model’s number of periods in order to
obtain more refined dynamics. In such an extension, we may want to model produc-
ers’ technology such that previous periods’ cost savings endure and can be further
improved upon by learning by doing in subsequent periods. As a preliminary step,
however, it may be interesting already to make first period costs type-dependent
in our two-period model. Recall that in order to focus only on the returns-side to
learning by doing (and to focus on the principal’s problem of keeping checks on
second period informational asymmetries), we have assumed above that different
agents have identical first-period marginal costs. Relaxing this assumption may
prove interesting in its own right. Finally, we have already hinted at the fact that
assuming full long-term commitment on behalf of the principal may be unrealistic
in certain situations, not least because actual long-term procurement relations and
particularly regulation are often observed to be governed by short-term contracts
(see Lewis and Yildirim, 2002a, on the latter). Indeed, when full commitment is
available to the principal, we have seen that by the revelation principle, the dy-
namic problem essentially reduces a static one from a contracting perspective, in
that the agent truthfully reveals his type prior to the first period which already de-
termines all future transactions. Thus, it should be interesting to see how extending
our analysis to situations in which the principal can only imperfectly commit alters
the results.
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A Appendix
A.1 Properties of the Φ(q1, q2)-function
The first assertion is due to
Φ(q1, q2) = δq2[c2(q1, θ)− c2(q1, θ)] = −δq2
R θ
θ
∂
∂θc2(q1, θ)dθ
and ∂c2/∂θ < 0 by assumption. The second assertion concerning the sign of ∂Φ(q1, q2)/∂q2 =
Φ(q1, q2) follows immediately then from taking the derivative of the right hand side. For
the third assertion, note that
∂
∂q1Φ(q1, q2) = δq2[
∂
∂q1 c2(q1, θ)−
∂
∂q1 c2(q1, θ)] = −δq2
R θ
θ
∂2
∂q1∂θc2(q1, θ)dθ.
Observation 4 regarding the sign of ∂
2
∂q1∂q2Φ again follows from taking partials on the right
hand side.
Finally, for observation 5 note that
∂2
∂q21
Φ = δq2
·
∂2c2(q1, θ)
∂q21
− ∂
2c2(q1, θ)
∂q21
¸
∂2
∂q22
Φ = 0
∂2
∂q1∂q2Φ = δ
·
∂c2(q1, θ)
∂q1
− ∂c2(q1, θ)∂q1
¸
,
so that the condition ∂
2
∂q21
Φ· ∂2∂q22Φ ≥
∂2
∂q1∂q2Φ, which is necessary and sufficient for convexity,
will only be satisfied for ∂
2
∂q1∂q2Φ = 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Part (a)
The incentive constraint of an agent of type θ is given by
U = z1 − c1q1 + δ[z2 − c2(q1, θ)q2]
≥ z1 − c1q1 + δ[z2 − c2(q1, θ)q2]
= U + δq2[c2(q1, θ)− c2(q1, θ)].
Here, the first line simply restates the definition of the θ-type’s utility from accepting
his type’s contract. The second line gives the θ-type’s utility from accepting the θ-type’s
contract, which may not yield him more utility for the contract to be incentive compatible.
Finally, the third line rewrites the second line by using the definition of U , the inefficient
type’s rent, to substitute out for that type’s aggregate transfers z1 + δz2.
The incentive constraint of a θ-agent is obtained similarly. Summing up, incentive
compatibility requires that–stated in rent-output terms–contracts satisfy
U ≥ U + δq2[c2(q1, θ)− c2(q1, θ)]
U ≥ U − δq2[c2(q1, θ)− c2(q1, θ)].
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Using the Φ-function as defined in (3), these incentive constraints may be written more
compactly as
U ≥ U +Φ(q1, q2) (IC)
U ≥ U − Φ(q1, q2). (IC)
Next, let us consider the principal’s objective. Given any set of type dependent pay-
ments and production levels, the principal’s expected payoff from the truth-revealing con-
tract is given by
ν
©
S(q1)− z1 + δ[S(q2)− z2]
ª
+ (1− ν)
©
S(q1)− z1 + δ[S(q2)− z2]
ª
.
Using our definition of rents U(θ) to substitute out for aggregate payments z1(θ)+ δz2(θ),
the principal’s payoff may equivalently be written in terms of rents and production levels
as
ν
©
S(q1)− c1q1 + δ[S(q2)− c2(q1, θ)q2]
ª
+ (1− ν)
©
S(q1)− c1q1 + δ[S(q2)− c2(q1, θ)q2]
ª
− νU − (1− ν)U .
The principal maximizes this payoff by choice of {q1, q2, U} and {q1, q2, U} subject to
incentive and participation constraints (IC) through (PC), which we restate here for con-
venience:
U ≥ U +Φ(q1, q2) (IC)
U ≥ U − Φ(q1, q2) (IC)
U ≥ 0 (PC)
U ≥ 0. (PC)
For argument’s sake, we may treat this simultaneous optimization as a sequential decision
in which the principal first chooses an allocation {q1, q2, q1, q2} and then picks rents offered
to agents, {U,U} (and thereby implicitly transfers).
First off, note that any allocation such that Φ(q1, q2) < Φ(q1, q2) cannot be imple-
mented by means of any choice of rents. To see this, note that the two incentive constraints
taken together imply Φ(q1, q2) ≤ U − U ≤ Φ(q1, q2). Thus, only allocations {q1, q2, q1, q2}
satisfying the implementability condition Φ(q1, q2) ≥ Φ(q1, q2) given by inequality (5) of the
proposition can be realized by a direct revelation mechanism in the first place. Following
the literature, we shall call any menu of allocations satisfying (5) implementable.
Next, let us make the following standard observations on constraints (IC) through
(PC) at the optimum, given any desired allocation {q1, q2, q1, q2}:
1. Constraint (PC) is binding at the optimum.
2. Constraint (PC) can be neglected.
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3. Constraint (IC) is binding at the optimum.
4. For any implementable allocation {q1, q2, q1, q2} (i.e., satisfying (5)), constraint (IC)
can be neglected.
(Given the properties of the Φ-function derived in Lemma 2, the proofs are standard; see
for instance Salanié, 1997, p. 22—23.) By substituting for U and U , assertions 1 and 3
allow us to rewrite the objective function in terms of outputs only as
ν
©
S(q1)− c1q1 + δ[S(q2)− c2(q1, θ)q2]
ª
+ (1− ν)
©
S(q1)− c1q1 + δ[S(q2)− c2(q1, θ)q2]
ª
(4)
− νΦ(q1, q2).
Next, assertion 2 lets us drop constraint (PC). Finally, assertion 4 lets us replace constraint
(IC) with the implementability condition (5). Hence, the principal’s mechanism design
problem ultimately reduces to choosing {q1, q2, q1, q2} so as to maximize (4) subject to
(5). We have thus recast the principal’s problem of offering a menu optimal incentive
compatible contracts {z1(θ), z2(θ), q1(θ), q2(θ)} into a reduced-form problem in which the
principal decides on a menu of allocations {q1(θ), q2(θ)}, where any such menu is efficiently
implemented by setting types’ rents at U = Φ(q1, q2) and U = 0, which in turn implicity
determines discounted total transfers z1(θ) + δz2(θ) for every menu item.
Proof of Part (b)
Recall that we have shown that the principal’s problem of finding the optimal incentive
compatible contract can be reduced to choosing a menu of allocations maximizing (4)
subject to (5). What remains to be shown is that menus of allocations which violate (5)
are never optimal, which we prove by showing that any allocation violating (5) can be
replaced by another allocation which yields a strictly higher payoff to the principal and
meets (5).13
Consider a menu of contracts with the θ-type being asked to produce (q◦1, q◦2) and the
θ-type being asked to produce (q◦1, q◦2). Assume further that Φ(q◦1, q◦2) > Φ(q◦1, q◦2), i.e. that
the menu of contracts violates the implementability condition (5).
Now consider the following set of allocations, (q1, q2), parameterized by α ∈ [0, 1],
which constitute linear combinations of the original allocations (q◦1, q◦2) and (q◦1, q◦2):"
q1(α)
q2(α)
#
= α
"
q◦1
q◦2
#
+ (1− α)
"
q◦1
q◦2
#
, where α ∈ [0, 1].
Now assume that in a new menu of contracts, the θ-type is asked to produce such a
linear combination with α = α, and the θ-type one with α = α. Observe that the original
13Remember that we have shown that the principal optimally implements any menu of allocations
[(q1, q2); (q1,, q2)] by setting transfers such that U = 0 and U = Φ(q1, q2), which allows us to
represent the principal’s choice in reduced form as one of offering a menu of allocations only.
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set of contracts results for α = 1 and α = 0. Assume further that α and α are chosen such
that
να = (1− ν)(1− α). (14)
The motivation for imposing (14) will become clear below. For now, note that this re-
striction on α and α ensures that expected first- and second-period quantities from the
new contract (where expectations are taken over possible types θ) are the same as those
resulting from the original contract. Next, let
g(q1, q2, q1, q2) ≡ ν
©
S(q1 − c1q1 + δ[S(q2 − c2(q1, θ)q2]
ª
+ (1− ν)
©
S(q1)− c1q1 + δ[S(q2)− c2(q1, θ)q2]
ª
− νΦ(q1, q2).
denote the principal’s objective function as given in (4). Since g is concave in its arguments
by assumption,
g[q1(α), q2(α), q1(α), q2(α)] ≥ ααg[q◦1, q◦2, q◦1, q◦2] + α(1− α)g[q◦1, q◦2, q◦1, q◦2]
+ (1− α)αg[q◦1, q◦2, q◦1, q◦2] + (1− α)(1− α)g[q◦1, q◦2, q◦1, q◦2]
(15)
by Jensen’s inequality. Next, we make use of the additive separability of g(·) in (q1, q2)
and (q1, q2). Specifically, let
g(q1, q2) ≡
©
S(q1)− c1q1 + δ[S(q2)− c2(q1, θ)q2]
ª
g(q1, q2) ≡
©
S(q1)− c1q1 + δ[S(q2)− c2(q1, θ)q2]
ª
− ν
1− νΦ(q1, q2),
so that we may write the principal’s payoff function as
g(q1, q2, q1, q2) = νg(q1, q2) + (1− ν)g(q1, q2).
Then we may rewrite the right-hand side of inequality (15) as
ααg[q◦1, q◦2, q◦1, q◦2] + α(1− α)g[q◦1, q◦2, q◦1, q◦2]
+ (1− α)αg[q◦1, q◦2, q◦1, q◦2] + (1− α)(1− α)g[q◦1, q◦2, q◦1, q◦2]
= ανg(q◦1, q◦2) + (1− α)νg(q◦1, q◦2) + α(1− ν)g(q◦1, q◦2) + (1− α)(1− ν)g(q◦1, q◦2)
= νg(q◦1, q◦2) + (1− ν)g(q◦1, q◦2) + αν
h
g(q◦1, q◦2)− g(q◦1, q◦2) + g(q◦1, q◦2)− g(q◦1, q◦2)
i
= g(q◦1, q◦2, q◦1, q◦2) + αν
h
g(q◦1, q◦2)− g(q◦1, q◦2) + g(q◦1, q◦2)− g(q◦1, q◦2)
i
,
where we get to the third line by using additive separability (i.e. by plugging in the additive
decomposition of g(·) into g(·) and g(·) and collecting terms), from the third to the fourth
line by using (14) to substitute out for α and rearranging, and to the last line by collecting
the first two terms.14 Hence, from inequality (15), we have a lower bound on the extent to
14To aide interpretation, it may be helpful to note that the second line reveals that this payoff
is equivalent to what would be obtained by offering a stochastic menu of contracts in which the
good θ-type produces (q◦1 , q◦2) with probability α and (q◦1 , q◦2) with probability 1− α, and the bad
θ-type produces (q◦1 , q◦2) with probability α and (q◦1 , q◦2) with probability 1− α.
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which the payoff from the newly constructed contract exceeds that from the original one:
g[q1(α), q2(α), q1(α), q2(α)]− g(q◦1, q◦2, q◦1, q◦2)
≥ αν
h
g(q◦1, q◦2)− g(q◦1, q◦2) + g(q◦1, q◦2)− g(q◦1, q◦2)
i
.
By plugging back in the definitions of g(·) and g(·), we may rewrite the right-hand term
in brackets as
g(q◦1, q◦2)− g(q◦1, q◦2) + g(q◦1, q◦2)− g(q◦1, q◦2)
= −δc2(q◦1, θ)q◦2 + δc2(q◦1, θ)q◦2 +
ν
1− νΦ(q
◦
1, q◦2)
− δc2(q◦1, θ)q◦2 −
ν
1− νΦ(q
◦
1, q◦2) + δc2(q◦1, θ)q◦2
= Φ(q◦1, q◦2) +
ν
1− νΦ(q
◦
1, q◦2)− Φ(q◦1, q◦2)−
ν
1− νΦ(q
◦
1, q◦2)
=
ν
1− ν
h
Φ(q◦1, q◦2)− Φ(q◦1, q◦2)
i
,
so that the lower bound may be rewritten as
g[q1(α), q2(α), q1(α), q2(α)]− g(q◦1, q◦2, q◦1, q◦2) ≥ α
ν2
1− ν
h
Φ(q◦1, q◦2)− Φ(q◦1, q◦2)
i
.
Now since Φ(q◦1, q◦2)−Φ(q◦1, q◦2) > 0 by assumption, the right-hand-side expression is strictly
positive for any α > 0. Thus, we have shown that any new set of contracts with α > 0
yields a strictly higher payoff to the principal than the original set of contracts.
Finally, we want to argue that while the original contract violates the implementability
condition (5), we can pick α > 0 such that the resulting new contract meets (5). To this
end, for any α, define eΦ(α) ≡ Φ[q1(α), q2(α)]. The implementability condition (5) for the
new set of contracts parameterized by α and α can then compactly be written as
eΦ(α) > eΦ(α).
Observe first that eΦ is monotonous in α. To see this, note that
∂
∂α
eΦ = ∂∂q1Φ · (q◦1 − q◦1) + (q◦2 − q◦2) · ∂∂q2Φ,
where the signs on ∂Φ/∂q1 and ∂Φ/∂q2 are constant by Lemma 2. Furthermore, since
Φ(q◦1, q◦2) < Φ(q◦1, q◦2) by assumption, where the former results for α = 0 and the latter for
α = 1, eΦ must be strictly increasing in α.
Depending on whether there are more or less good than bad types (i.e. whether ν ≥ 1/2
or ν ≤ 1/2), we can now set α and α as follows:
1. Assume that bad types are more prevalent, so that ν ≤ 1/2. Then, we can set α = 1
and, by (14), α = (1 − 2ν)/(1 − ν) ∈ [0, 1). Then eΦ(α) = Φ(q◦1, q◦2). Furthermore,
since eΦ(1) = Φ(q◦1, q◦2) and we know both that eΦ is strictly increasing in α and that
α < 1, we must have eΦ(α) < Φ(q◦1, q◦2). Thus, the new contract satisfies (5).
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2. When good types are more prevalent, so ν ≥ 1/2, we can set α = (1− ν)/ν ∈ (0, 1]
and α = 0. Now eΦ(α) = Φ(q◦1, q◦2) and eΦ(α) > Φ(q◦1, q◦2), where the latter again
follows from eΦ(0) = Φ(q1, q2), α > 0, and from eΦ being strictly increasing in α.
In sum, we have thus shown that for any contract involving an allocation that violates
the implementability condition (5), we can find a new incentive compatible contract which
(i) yields a strictly higher payoff the the principal and (ii) meets the implementability
condition. Hence, the implementability condition can be neglected in the principal’s opti-
mization problem.
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